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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CELIA ANDERSON,
Appellant,
Case No. 870421
vs.
Case Priority No. 14(b)
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC AND
RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGEONS, and
DR. ROBERT GOLDWYN,
Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC AND
RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGEONS AND DR. ROBERT GOLDWYN
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether this Court may assume the correctness of the

judgment below, where, as here, Anderson failed to factually
support her contentions on appeal with citations to the Record?
II.

Whether the lower court properly dismissed appellant

Celia Anderson's ("Anderson") claims against respondents
American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc.

("ASPRS") and Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D. ("Dr. Goldwyn") for lack
of i_n personam jurisdiction because:
A.

ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn do not have sufficient

minimum contacts with the State of Utah to satisfy the Utah
Long-arm Statute; and
B.

Assertion of In Personam jurisdiction over ASPRS

and Dr. Goldwyn would violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The statutory provisions relevant to a determinative
resolution of the present case are (1) Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-24 (1987); (2) Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 (1987); and (3)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal arises out of an action to recover damages for
personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result of Celia
Anderson's voluntary participation in a Silicone Injection
Study, involving the use of MDX 4-4011, a sterile injectable
silicone fluid for soft tissue augmentation.
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Course of Proceedings Below
On September 25, 1987, the district court granted respondents' Motions to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Complaint because respondents ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn
(1) "did not have sufficient contact with the State of Utah or
plaintiff sufficient to satisfy the minimum contact requirement
for assertion of IJI personam jurisdiction. . . ;" and (2) "To
assert jin personam jurisdiction over [respondents] under the
circumstances of this case would constitute a violation of
constitutional due process." (Record at 1733, 1739-41, 1750.)
See Order of Dismissal, attached hereto as Addendum "A."
On October 22, 1987, Celia Anderson filed notice of appeal,
seeking review of the lower court's Order of Dismissal.
(Record at 1747. )
Statement of the Facts
A.

Jurisdictional Facts Relative to Dr. Goldwyn.

Dr. Goldwyn is a medical doctor, specializing in plastic
and reconstructive surgery and is licensed to practice medicine
in the State of Massachusetts.

(Record at 1466 and Affidavit

of Dr. Goldwyn ("Goldwyn Affidavit") at 1f 2, attached hereto as
Addendum "B.")
Dr. Goldwyn acts as medical monitor for a Silicone
Injection Study.

(Record at 1810 and Deposition of Robert M.

Goldwyn, M.D. ("Goldwyn Depo.") at 5:5-10.)
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Dr. Goldwyn's role as medical monitor for the Silicone
Injection Study is limited to screening potential patients'
medical information to determine from such information whether
the patients comport with FDA guidelines for acceptance into
the Study.

(Record at 1466-67, 1810; Goldwyn Depo. at 5:11-22,

30-33; and Goldwyn Affidavit at 1f 6-7.)
Based on medical information sent from Anderson's physician
to Dr. Goldwyn in Massachusetts, Dr. Goldwyn gave approval for
Anderson's voluntary entry into the Silicone Injection Study.
(Record at 1466-67, 1810; Goldwyn Depo. at 39-40 and Goldwyn
Affidavit at 1f1f 6-7. )
Dr. Goldwyn was not Anderson's physician and did not provide her any medical treatment or service.

Dr. Goldwyn's role

in plaintiff's entry in the Silicone Injection Study was
strictly limited to review of medical information unilaterally
provided by plaintiff's physician.

(Record at 1467 and Goldwyn

Affidavit at 1f 7. )
Dr. Goldwyn's review of Anderson's medical information was
conducted in Massachusetts and Dr. Goldwyn has never seen or
communicated with Anderson.

Anderson never heard of Dr.

Goldwyn until after this action was filed.

(Record at 1624.)

Anderson litigated this case against "a person she had never
heard of."

Id.

-4-

Dr. Goldwyn is a resident of Brookline, Massachusetts.
(Record at 1466 and Goldwyn Affidavit at 1f 1. ) He has never
been licensed to practice medicine in Utah.

He has never

advertised, maintained an office or otherwise transacted any
business or practiced any medicine in the State of Utah.
Dr. Goldwyn does not own, use or possess any real property
situated in Utah.

(Record at 1466 and Goldwyn Affidavit at

ir 5.)
Dr. Goldwyn is not employed as a medical doctor for the
American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons.
(Record at 1466 and Goldwyn Affidavit at 1f 3.)
Dr. Goldwyn is not a medical doctor, agent, employee or
representative of or for the Dow Corning Corporation ("Dow").
Id. at ir 4.
Dr. Goldwyn has not played any part in the development and
use of MDX4-4011 injectable silicone, except for performing the
limited function of approving patients' voluntary enrollment in
the Study according to FDA guidelines.

(Record at 1810 and

Goldwyn Depo. at p. 5:11-18.)
Dr. Goldwyn's contacts, if any, with Utah and Anderson
arise out of the unilateral act of Anderson's physician, who
forwarded medical information to Dr. Goldwyn in Massachusetts.
Dr. Goldwyn also engaged in limited correspondence to
Anderson's physician.

(Record at 1466-67 and Goldwyn Affidavit

at 1F1f 3-7.)
-5-

B.

Jurisdictional Facts Relative to ASPRS:

ASPRS is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, exempt
from federal income taxation pursuant to Section 501(c)(6) of
the Internal Revenue Code (Record at 1444 and Affidavit of
Thomas R. Schedler,("Schedler Affidavit") at 1f 2, attached
hereto as Addendum "C")
ASPRS is not qualified to do business in Utah, has no
office or employee in Utah and has no agent for acceptance of
service of process in Utah.

(Record at 1444 and Schedler

Affidavit at 11 3.)
ASPRS has not contracted to supply services or goods in the
State of Utah, has no telephone listing in Utah, has no bank
account in Utah, and does not own, use or possess any real
estate situated in Utah.

Id.

ASPRS does not and cannot practice medicine in Utah or in
any state.

(Record at 1444 and Schedler Affidavit at 1f 4.)

ASPRS does not manufacture, sell or distribute MDX4-4011 or
any drug or device in the State of Utah or any state and did
not draft or distribute the consent form for participation in
the MDX 4-4011 Silicone Injection Study.

Id.

For at least the past 10 years, ASPRS has not conducted any
educational symposia or seminars in Utah.
Schedler Affidavit at 1f 9. )
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(Record at 1445 and

ASPRS is a voluntary membership association of
approximately 2,600 plastic surgeons practicing in the United
States and Canada; approximately 30 active members reside in
Utah.

(Record at 1444-45 and Schedler Affidavit at 1f1f 5-7.)

The ASPRS membership meets once a year.

The ASPRS annual

meeting has never been held in the State of Utah.

Id.

ASPRS is governed by a twenty-one member Board of
Directors, none of whom reside in Utah.

(Record at 1446 and

Schedler Affidavit at 1f 14.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The correctness of the lower court's decision to quash
service of process and dismiss Anderson's claims against
Dr. Goldwyn and ASPRS for lack of in personam jurisdiction
should be assumed correct because Anderson failed to support
her factual contentions on appeal with any specific citations
to the record.

Indeed, the few citations to the record upon

which Andersen purports to rely are extrapolation or mischaracterization.
The Utah forum has no in personam jurisdiction over
Dr. Goldwyn and ASPRS because:

(1) respondents have not

engaged in any of the activities enumerated by the Utah
Long-arm Statute; and (2) respondents do not have any meaningful minimum contacts or relationships with the State of Utah or
Anderson.

Any contacts that may exist between respondents and
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this forum are too random and attenuated to constitutionally
support assertion of in personam jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF
THE JUDGMENT BELOW BECAUSE ANDERSON FAILED
TO REFER TO THE RECORD TO FACTUALLY SUPPORT
HER CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL.
This Court has consistently held that it will assume the
correctness of the judgment below, where, as here, an appellant
does not properly support facts set forth in her brief with
citations to the Record.

Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613

(Utah 1987) and State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah
1982).

In Trees, this Court declared that it:

will assume the correctness of the judgment below
where counsel on appeal does not comply with the
requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, as to making a concise statement of
facts and citations of the pages in the record where
they are supported. (Citations omitted).1
In Trees, the fact statement in the appellant's Brief referred
to documents by their exhibit numbers, but contained no citations to the Record.

Occasional references to the record

l-Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, which became
effective in April 1987, ultimately replaced former Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 75(p)(2)(2)(d), but did not alter the
requirement that citations to the record to support the fact
statement in the Briefs. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613, n.3.

appeared in the Argument section of the Brief.

Trees, 738 P.2d

at 612, n.2.
Similarly, in State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah
1982), this Court concluded that:
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer
to any portion of the record that factually supports
his contention on appeal.
In the instant case, despite references to exhibits and
affidavits contained in the Record, Anderson makes only occasional extrapolated references to the Record to support her
factual contentions.

In many instances, as set forth in detail

below, there is no reference to any source other than
Anderson's own opinion or mere allegation.

Accordingly, this

Court should assume the correctness of the judgment below and
may affirm the lower court's judgment on this independent basis.
POINT II
UTAH COURTS LACK IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
OVER DR. GOLDWYN AND ASPRS.
The outermost reaches of amenability to in personam
jurisdiction are governed by the law of the forum state, as
limited under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.

Mallory

Engineering, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Assoc, 618 P.2d 1004, 1008
(Ut*h 1980).

See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1987).
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Utah law, as limited by due process only allows assertion
of in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant when
two conditions are satisfied:

First, a defendant, through

significant minimum contacts with the forum, must purposefully
avail himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the
forum.

Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578

P.2d 850, 854 (Utah 1978).

Second, such minimum contacts must

not only satisfy statutory requirements, but also must make the
exercise of jurisdiction comport with constitutional and
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945);
and Burt Drilling, Inc., v. Porta Drill, 608 P.2d 244, 247
(1980).
The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that a
defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of Utah courts.

See

Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257, 1259
(Utah 1976); and Segil v. Gloria Marshall Mqt. Co., 568 F.
Supp. 915, 917 (D. Utah 1983).

With respect to jurisdictional

determinations, this Court cautioned that:
plaintiff must show that his claim arises out of some
contact defendant has with the forum state, some
action undertaken by defendant by which it can be
shown that defendant has "purposefully availed himself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state."
Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1980),
quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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Once a

jurisdictional determination has been made, this Court will
presume its correctness:
we [The Utah Supreme Court] indulge the presumption of
verity and correctness of the trial court's determination and do not disturb it unless the plaintiff
has shown that it was in error.
Union Ski Co., 548 P.2d at 1259.

See also Cate Rental Co. v.

Wahlen & Co., 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976).
In summary, in order to satisfy Anderson's evidentiary
burden, she must have demonstrated, by competent evidence, that
not only the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-24
have been met, but also that the quality and nature of respondents' activities are such that it is reasonable and fair to
require them to conduct their defense in this state.

Mallory

Engineering, Inc. v. Brown, 618 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Utah 1980).
Having failed to satisfy this evidentiary burden in the trial
court, this Court will presume the correctness of the lower
court's Ruling that Utah has no jurisdiction over respondents.
Anderson cannot rest on mere allegations to establish error
in the lower court.

In Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172

(Utah 1983), this Court held that "mere assertions without
proper evidentiary foundation" are insufficient to preclude
granting of a dispositive motion.

Likewise, in Thornock v.

Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979), this Court stated that a
plaintiff must "set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial."
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In the instant case, Anderson failed to make any such
evidentiary showing.

Indeed, the essentially undisputed

evidence demonstrates that ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn have not
purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting
any activities in Utah. (Record at 1444-46 and 1466-67.)
Moreover, the evidence is clear that the quality and nature of
respondents' activities within this state, if any, fail to
satisfy constitutional "notions of fair play and substantial
justice" for assertion of in personam jurisdiction in Utah.
A.

ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn Are Not Subject to In Personam
Jurisdiction Under the Utah Long-Arm Statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1987) sets forth seven classes
of activity (minimum contacts) which may render a nonresident
subject to the jurisdiction of Utah courts under the Statute.
Section 78-27-24 provides as follows:
Any person . . . who in person or through em
agent does any of the following enumerated acts,
submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within the
state;
(2)

contracting to supply services or goods in
this state;

(3)

the causing of any injury within this state
whether tortious or by breach of warranty;

(4)

the ownership, use, or possession of any
real estate situated in this area. . . .
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Subparts (5), (6) and (7) of Section 78-27-24, relating to
insurance, divorce and paternity actions, respectively, are not
included as they clearly have no application in the instant
appeal.

As will be demonstrated, subparts (1) through (4) of

Utah's Long-arm Statute are likewise inapplicable.
To establish statutorily required minimum contacts, "the
defendant's conduct in connection with the forum state [must
be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there."

World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.

286, 297 (1980).

The Supreme Court's reasoning in Hanson v.

Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), explains when a defendant
should not anticipate out of state litigation:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a non-resident defendant cannot
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
state. The application of that rule will vary with
the quality and nature of the defendant's activity,
but it is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. (Emphasis added.)
Assertion of jurisdiction is not proper unless "the
contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant
himself that create a substantial connection with the forum
state."

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985),

(quoting McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957)) (Emphasis in original).
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Thus, to support a

determination of in personam jurisdiction a defendant's
contacts must not be "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated."
Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. at 253.
In the instant case, there is no evidence that ASPRS or
Dr. Goldwyn have transacted any business within the State of
Utah (Subpart 1). (Record at 1444-46 and 1466-67.)

Similarly,

there is no evidence that respondents "contracted" to supply
services or goods in the State of Utah (Subpart 2), or in any
way purposefully availed themselves of the privileges and
protections of conducting activities in this state.

_Id.

It is

undisputed that respondents do not own, use or possess any real
estate situated in the State of Utah (Subpart 4). Although
Anderson alleges that ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn caused injury
within this state, (Subpart 3), Anderson offers no specific
evidence to support her allegation.
B.

Dr. Goldwyn Does Not Have Sufficient Minimum Contacts
With The State Of Utah To Be Subject To In Personam
Jurisdiction.
1.

There is no meaningful relationship between Dr.
Goldwyn, the Utah forum and the instant
litigation.

In Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Assoc, 618
P.2d 1004 (Utah 1980), this court noted that:
[t]he central concern of this inquiry into personal
jurisdiction is the relationship of the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation, to each other.
Mallory, 618 P.2d at 1007.

See also Kulko v. Superior Court of

California, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
-14-
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Q.

Why is it a little strong?

A.
Because "conclude" implies a finality, and I
always felt that, not examining a patient, I cannot
make such a diagnosis, although it fit all the
criteria of our study.
(Record at 1810,)

Therefore, Dr. Goldwyn never diagnosed

Anderson, but merely reviewed medical information in
Massacnusetts.

Moreover, Anderson admits she never heard of

Dr. Goldwyn prior to this litigation.

(Record at 1124.) Under

these circumstances Anderson's unsupported contention that
"Goldwyn has had an ongoing interstate obligation and
relationship with her for over ten years" is at best
contradictory.
Finally, a detailed review of correspondence between
Anderson's physician, Dr. Woolf and Dr. Goldwyn confirms that
Dr. Goldwyn was only remotely informed as to Anderson's alleged
medical complications.
1650.)

(Record at 1632, 1636, 1641, 1645 and

The correspondence does not contain advice, diagnosis

or evidence of any treatment performed by Dr. Goldwyn because
he was never Anderson's physician.

The record simply reflects

monitoring functions which were performed only in Massachusetts.
2.

Dr. Goldwyn does not have sufficient contacts
with Utah to satisfy jurisdictional requirements
under Utah law.

Under circumstances where defendants have established more
substantial contacts in Utah than Dr. Goldwyn, this Court has
concluded that the Utah forum had no in personam jurisdiction.
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In the instant case, Dr. Goldwyn's only alleged jurisdictional contacts with Utah and Anderson arise out of:

(1)

review of Anderson's medical history in Massachusetts; (2)
approval of Anderson's unilateral and voluntary application for
entry in the Study, which approval was given in Massachusetts;
(3) participation in drafting a consent form outside of Utah;
(4) responsibility for a training program conducted in Ann
Arbor, Michigan; and (5) limited monitoring related correspondence to Anderson's physician.
Anderson's contention that Goldwyn "knew . . . he would be
approving silicone injection . . . in Utah is completely
unsupported.

Indeed, Dow Corning assumed the responsibility of

organizing content and offering a basic format for the consent
form, not Dr. Goldwyn.

(Record at 1677.) Moreover there is no

evidence to support the mere allegation that Dr. Goldwyn
introduced the consent form in Utah.

Under these facts, it

cannot be said that Dr. Goldwyn "purposefully established
'minimum contacts' in the forum state," which is "the constitutional touchstone" of this determination.

Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzawiez, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985), cpaoting International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

The essentially

undisputed evidence demonstrates, at most, only unintentional
contact with Utah, insufficient to establish necessary minimum
contacts in Utah.

See Abbott, 578 P.2d at 854.
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introducing of a consent form in Utah, and the consent form was
not the source of injury to Anderson.
Accordingly, Anderson's cited authorities are not applicable here.

For example, in Jones Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlas

Service Corporation, 442 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1971), the Court
held that assertion of jurisdiction was proper because the
out-of-state defendant purposefully introduced a defective
design in the forum state which caused a building to collapse.
Similarly, the jurisdictional contact in Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), arose out of the purposeful introduction of a libelous magazine into the forum state.
Finally, the jurisdictional contact in Burt v. Board of Regents
of the University of Nebraska, 757 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1985),
was a libelous letter purposefully sent into Colorado.
In each case cited by plaintiff, the jurisdictional contact
relied upon was some material that was (1) purposefully sent
into the foreign jurisdiction and (2) the direct source of
injury there.

Here, there is absolutely no factual support for

the allegation that Dr. Goldwyn introduced the consent form
into Utah or that the consent form was the Anderson's source of
injury.

Indeed, Anderson alleges that it was the injection of

silicone that resulted in her alleged injury.

(Anderson's

brief at p. 7.)
If Anderson's contention that mere assistance in drafting a
consent form is sufficient to satisfy jurisdictional
-20-
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Thus, the issues of informed consent and participati

in drafting a defective consent form are irrelevant.
4.

Dr. Goldwyn did not render medical diagnosis or
treatment for Anderson.

Plaintiff's cause of action against Dr. Goldwyn arises out
of limited monitoring activities which occurred only in
Massachusetts and bore no relationship to Utah.

In

interpreting the breadth and scope of the due process clause i
similar cases regarding assertion of in personam jurisdiction
over physicians, several courts have held that a patient may
not consider an alleged tort to be committed wherever the
consequences foreseeably may be felt.

Wright v. Yackley, 459

F.2d 287, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1972).
In Wright, the court held that the fact that a doctor was
on notice that the consequences of his South Dakota services
would be felt in Idaho was not sufficient to make the doctor
amenable to suit in Idaho under that State's Long-arm Statute.
The opinion states as follows:
In the case of personal services, focus must be on the
place where the services are rendered, since this is
the place of the receivers (here the patient's
need). . . . [T]he idea that tortuous rendition of
such services is a portable tort which can be deemed
to have been committed wherever the consequences
foreseeably were felt is wholly inconsistent with the
public interest in having services of this sort
generally available.
459 F.2d at 289-90.
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See Lemke v. St. Margaret Hospital, 552 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.
111. 1982 (an Indiana doctor who treated an Illinois patient
was not subject to long arm jurisdiction in Illinois solely
because his care in Indiana allegedly produced tortious injury
in Illinois); Kennedy v. Zeismann, 526 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Ky.
1983 ) (an Ohio doctor who treated Kentucky patient in Ohio and
who maintained a telephone listing in Kentucky, but who did not
otherwise advertise or solicit in Kentucky, was not subject to
jurisdiction of a Kentucky court in a malpractice suit); Cook
v. Searie, 475 F, Supp. 1166 (S.D. Iowa 1979) (Colorado doctors
who prescribed plaintiff's use of a contraceptive device while
plaintiff was a student in Colorado, were not subject to suit
i n Iowa where plaintiff resided when the injury allegedly
occurred); Glover v. Wagner, 462 F. Supp. 308 (D. Neb. 1978)
(where doctor's administration of chemotherapy was localized
and confined to Iowa, there were insufficient contacts with
Nebraska for the application of Nebraska's long-arm statute
notwithstanding the foreseeability of alleged effects occurring
in Nebraska); Kailieha v. Hayes, 536 P.2d 568 (Hawaii 1975) (a
Virginia physician who prescribed medication for a visiting
Hawaii resident was not subject to long-arm, jurisdiction in
Hawaii when following her return, the patient lost
consciousness wh i ] e dr i v ] ng 1 i er c ar and co ] ] ided w i t h
plaintiff.)
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Because Anderson sought monitoring ervices abroad, she may not
consider a tort to be committed wherever the consequences
foreseeably were felt.

Anderson's medical information was

unilaterally forwarded to Dr. Goldwyn in Massachusetts.

Thus,

for all intents and purposes, any act of Dr. Goldwyn took place
only in Massachusetts and bore no relation to Utah.
Nevertheless, Anderson contends that assertion of
jurisdiction over a doctor is appropriate if the doctor
diagnoses a patient via telephone or by mail, while the patient
is in his or her own state of residence.

Again, plaintiff's

supporting case authorities are inapplicable to the instant
case because Dr. Goldwyn did not diagnose or treat Anderson.
(Record at 1467 and Goldwyn Affidavit at 1f1f 6-7.)
In McGhee v. Riekhof, 442 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Utah 1978),
cited by Anderson, the ophthalmologist over whom the Montana
court assumed jurisdiction had actually treated the
patient/plaintiff in Utah, had maintained weekly telephone
contact with the plaintiff, and had given medical advice
concerning plaintiff's return to work which was the direct
cause of injury to the plaintiff in Montana.

Similarly, in

S.R. v. City of Fairmont, 280 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 1981), cited
by Anderson, the defendant medical corporation actually
provided medical care for the patient/plaintiff and later
failed to provide follow-up care in West Virginia where the
defendant corporation derived direct economic benefits from
business solicitations.
-24-
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It is undisputed that none of these advisory

activities occurred in Utah.

IdL

More importantly, none of

these activities form a basis for jurisdiction over ASPRS in
Utah.
2.

No jurisdiction arises from allegations regarding
ASPRS' participation in drafting the consent form.

Anderson alleged that ASPRS drafted a defective consent
form which Anderson read in Utah, causing her to agree to
treatment which injured her.

Nevertheless, ASPRS established,

through its Executive Director that it did not draft the
consent form:

"ASPRS . . . did not draft, prepare or

distribute the consent form in issue".
Schedler Affidavit at 1f 4.)

(Record at 1444 and

Because this purported juris-

dictional fact was properly challenged, Anderson continued to
have the burden to come forward with proof of this jurisdictional fact by affidavit or otherwise.
P.2d at 1259.

Union Ski Co., 548

See also Dicesare-Engler Productions, Inc. v.

Mainman Ltd., 81 F.R.D. 703 (W.D. Pa. 1979); and Buckeye
Associates, Ltd. v. Fila Sports, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1484 (D.C.
Mass. 1985).
In response to this denial, Anderson submitted the
deposition of Arthur Rathjen, Director of the Dow Corning
Service to Medical Research, and specifically referred the
Court to Page 102 of his Deposition.
referred to reads as follows:

The specific testimony

"the ASPRS looked into the

-26-
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interrogatories whien were signed by Rathjen of IJA Corning.

Q.

Identify the authors of r.ne consent form which
was a"P°qedlv siqned K v y • - -+- — *

A.

The consent form was drat tec by Arthur Rathjen,
Director of Dow Corning Service to Medical
Research, Harvey Steinberg, FDA Counsel, and
Robert GcJcwyn, tht Medical Monitor.

(Record at ±81^ an-: F a"- ~ ^ ~:' Der o r:t i on at yi

•

I l:i : .

Rati Ljen was then as^ec wnotner t;:.s answer vai; : t : . > -.ccuia
or whether he was revising his pii..r testimony

He stated

folIcws'

imony has t>een the same right from the begin. uat it (the consent form) was prepared by Dr.
Goldwyn and our legal counsel, and the drafting of the
inform(ed) patienr consent, when it was received, from
Di. Goldwyn and the legal department, that I had it
typed up
did not prepare and I did not write the
informed patient consent.
Id.
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Additionally, Exhibits attached to Anderson's own
Memorandum In Opposition to the ASPRS' Motion to Dismiss,
contradict involvement by the ASPRS with the consent form.
Exhibit B of plaintiff's brief contains the Dow Corning minutes
of April 11, 1977.

Paragraph E(l) of this Exhibit reads as

follows:
E.

Subject of Patient Consent Form.

1.
Dow Corning will assume responsibility of
organizing content and offering a basic format.
(Record at 1677. )
In summary, ASPRS did not draft the consent form; and
Responses to Anderson's Interrogatories, signed by Dow Corning
confirm this fact.

Finally Anderson's own Exhibits advance

ASPRS's argument that it was not involved with drafting the
consent form.

In response, Anderson merely extrapolates

portions of the deposition testimony of Arthur Rathjen and asks
this Court to infer involvement by the ASPRS.

Under these

circumstances, Anderson has clearly not met her burden of
proving this jurisdictional issue.
Moreover, even if this Court determined that Anderson
created a fact issue regarding ASPRS' participation in drafting
the consent form, this allegedly disputed fact is insufficient
to establish jurisdiction.
Under Utah law, only the relationship between a doctor and
patient creates a duty on the part of a physician to disclose

-28-
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Notably, plaintiff presents this theory for the first t^me in
her Appellate Brief and even then devotes only a single
sentence in a footnote to establishing her theory. Anderson
purports to rely on Salt Lake City School Dist. v. Galbraith &
Green, Inc., 74 0 P.2d 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), however this
case deals with equitable indemnity. Because Anderson failed
to raise this issue in the trial court, she cannot assert it
for the first time on appeal. See Insley Manufacturing Corp,
v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986).
Moreover, in the instant case, Anderson fails to indentify the
contract or agreement to which she was not a party and which
forms the basis for the alleged theory of third party
beneficiary recovery. In fact, no such contract exists.
Accordingly, there is no basis for assertion of in personam
jurisdiction over ASPRS based on a third party beneficiary
theory. See Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Surety Insurance
Co. of California, 703 P."2d 298 (Utah 1 985),
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3.

ASPRS did not contract to supply goods or
services in Utah.

Anderson's assertion that ASPRS contracted to supply
services (Dr. Woolf) is completely without factual support.
Anderson failed to identify or plead the existence of a
contract for services and, in fact, there is no legally
contractual relationship betwen ASPRS and Dr. Woolf.

Dr. Woolf

is a resident of Utah, licensed to practice medicine therein,
and free to practice his specialty.
ASPRS does not deny that, in its advisory capacity, it
pre-screened the qualifications of potential clinical investigators for approval by Dow Corning and the FDA.

The

pre-screening process, however, merely consisted of checking
qualifications of investigators based on FDA articulated
criteria.

There is no dispute whether Dr. Woolf met the

criteria set forth by the FDA for participation as an
investigator.

In any event, the final choice was under the

control of Dow Corning and the FDA in all cases.

Exhibit A of

Anderson's brief states as follows:
5.

Selection of Treatment Team

d.

The FDA requires a complete curriculum vitae from
every member of the Team for their evaluation and
final approval.

h.

ISPAC (Injectable Silicone Program Advisory
Committee) will select team. DCC (Dow Corning)
reserves veto right.

(Record at 1671.)
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Additionally, Exhibit B of Anderson's brief states:
4.

g.

Proposed list of ASPRS candidates will be
assembled by silicone injection committee,
but Dow Corning has the privilege of veto.

(Record at 1678. )
Finally, Exhibit C of Anderson's brief states:
III. Proposed Candidates for Participation in Service
IND
Drs. Musgrave and Elliott have prepared and submitted
a list of 21 candidates with two more to be identified
(Hawaii and Phoenix, Arizona). Rathjen (Dow Corning)
has taken the list to review and will get back to
Musgrave with Dow Coming's recommendations on acceptance. Dr. Musgrave will then contact candidates for
their curriculum vitae.
(Record at 1685.)
There is no basis for Anderson's assertion that by screening potential investigators, pursuant to objective criteria,
ASPRS "contracted to supply services in the state of Utah."
Accordingly, this alleged activity by the ASPR does not give
rise to :in personam jurisdiction under the Utah Long arm
statute or the due process clause of the Constitution.
4.

The contacts of Dow Corning with the forum are
not imputed to ASPRS.

Plaintiff's final argument is that Dow and the ASPRS are
joint venturers and therefore the contacts of Dow Corning are
imputed to the ASPRS.

In support of this proposition,

Plaintiff cites Aigner v. Bell Helicopters, Inc., 86 F.R.D.
532, 540 (N.D. 111. 1980).

In Aigner, the court recited the
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following as necessary elements for establishing the existence
of a joint venture:
1.

A relationship based on a contract (express or
implied).

2.

A community of interest in the purpose of the
joint adventure.

3.

The right of the parties to direct and govern the
conduct of each other.

4.

A proprietary interest in the subject matter.

5.

Expectation of profits.

6.

Sharing of profits.

7.

Sharing of losses.

The Aigner Court conferred jurisdiction only after finding
that "[t]he factual contentions set forth by the Plaintiffs
. . . as supported by the evidentiary materials referred to
therein . . .(were) sufficient to constitute at least a prima
facie showing that each of the requisite joint venture elements
was present in the . . . business relationship in question."
Id. at 541.

(Emphasis added).

Anderson claims that a "fact issue" exists.

The record

does not support this claim.
a)

Dow and ASPRS did not have the right to
direct and govern the conduct of each other.

Dow authored the protocol and ASPRS had no control over
it.

Although ASPRS was consulted regarding some aspects of the

study, Dow (and the FDA) at all times retained veto power over
recommendations made.

The evidence proffered by Anderson in
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support of its allegations of ASPRS "control" are various
minutes of meetings between ASPRS and Dow (Anderson's Exhibits
A-C, attached to Anderson Brief).4

What is clear from

Anderson's Exhibits is that ASPRS only acted as an advisor for
some aspects of the Study.

ASPRS did not control or

participate in the investigations
Exhibit B to Anderson's brief (minutes by Dow Corning)
states as follows:
Dow or Corning is the recognized sponsor and must
answer to the FDA, will take the initiative if study
protocol is violated or abused by individual
investigators.
(Record at 1677 and Anderson's Exhibit B, Section D(3)(d)(2).)
Most importantly, the Application to the FDA regarding MDX
4-4011 specifically list Dow Corning Corporation as the sole
sponsor of the study.

(Record at 1447-48)

This fact further

undermines Anderson's mischaracterization of ASPRS' advisory
role.
b)

There is no actual or implied contract
between ASPRS and Dow

In alleging a joint venture, Anderson, in her brief,
presumes the existence of a contract between Dow and ASPRS with

4

It is the position of ASPRS that the minutes relied on by
Anderson do not qualify as competent evidence absent foundation
testimony. ASPRS' reference to these Exhibits is not intended
to constitute a waiver of its standing objection to Anderson's
reliance on these documents.
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regard to the protocol.

This presumption is apparently based

on sections of minutes and proposed minutes of certain meetings
between Dow and ASPRS.
C).

(See Anderson's brief at Exhibits A -

These documents fail to establish any of the elements

necessary for contract.
Although it is not disputed that ASPRS rendered advice to
Dow with regard to certain aspects of the protocol, this fact
does not constitute a contract between the parties.
ASPRS received no consideration for its involvement.

Indeed,
The

activities of ASPRS are more accurately characterized as a
public service.
That the parties did not intend to be bound is further
evidenced by Anderson's Exhibit "A" wherein it is stated "Dow
Corning reserves the right to withdraw from the program if
untoward expense is noted."

(Record at 1669-73.)

Moreover, it is not even alleged that the so-called implied
contract between ASPRS and Dow contemplated expectation of profits nor sharing of profits and losses.

Without these essen-

tial elements, there can be no finding of a joint venture.
c)

The Record is devoid of evidence that ASPRS
had a proprietary interest in the subject
matter, that it had an expectation of
profits, or that it shared profits and
losses with Dow.

In Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1,2 (Utah 1974), the Utah
Supreme Court defined a joint venture as "an agreement between
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two or more persons ordinarily, but not necessarily limited to
a single transaction for the purpose of making a profit."
(Emphasis added).

It is undisputed that ASPRS did not intend

to (and did not) make a profit as a result of its gratuitous
advice.

Indeed, ASPRS is a not-for-profit voluntary medical

association.

(Record at 1444.) Moreover, it is undisputed

that ASPRS had no expectation of profit, and did not share
profits or losses with Dow.5

Accordingly, on this basis

alone, there is no issue as to whether ASPRS can be considered
a joint venturer.
The burden of establishing jurisdictional facts is on
Anderson.

Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Philadelphia

Resins, 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985).

She is not entitled to

rely on mere allegations without proper evidentiary foundation.

Thornock, 604 P.2d at 936.

In this regard, Anderson has had ample opportunity to
conduct discovery on the jurisdictional question and remains
without any competent evidence to support her jurisdictional
claim.

Accordingly, ASPRS should be dismissed from this

5

Dow did not have an expectation of profit. Exhibit A to
Anderson's brief (ASPRS minutes of 4/18/77) states: "...DCC
(Dow Corning) would like to develop a program that would make
the fluid available on a limited, non-profit basis for the
treatment of a defined group of patients with severe defects
where other therapeutic methods did not appear adequate."
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lawsuit at this juncture.

Saraceno v. S. C. Johnson & Son,

Inc., 83 F.R.D. 65 (D.C. N.Y., 1979).
POINT III
ASSERTION OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER
RESPONDENTS WOULD VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE
PROCESS.
In addition to satisfying the minimum contacts requirements
of Utah's Long Arm Statute, the constitutional requirements of
due process must also be satisfied before jurisdiction may be
asserted over a non-resident defendant.

World-Wide Volkswagen

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Burt Drilling,
Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 247 (Utah 1980).

In Burt

Drilling, this Court stated that:
[a]fter determining that Section 78-27-24 . . . has
been satisfied, the remaining question is whether it
is consistent with our traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice to require defendant to
defend this action in our courts. (Citations omitted.)
Burt Drilling, 608 P.2d at 247.
The United States Supreme Court stated that certain factors
may be considered to determine whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction fails to comport with "fair play and
substantial justice."

International Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
included among others:

The factors listed by the Court

a defendant's purposeful activity in

the forum, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute, the burdens on the defendant, and the shared interests
-36-

of the several states in furthering fundamental, substantive
social policy.

See also Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184 and

Worldwide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
A.

ASPRS And Dr. Goldwyn Did Not Engage In Purposeful
Activities In Utah.

The United States Supreme Court stresses "fair warning" and
"foreseeability" as important factors in evaluating "minimum
contacts" and determining "fair play and substantial justice."
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)
(citations omitted).
The Supreme Court of this State has also consistently held
that in order for a nonresident defendant to become subject to
the jurisdiction of the Utah courts, there must have been some
intentional and purposeful activity of such defendant in the
State of Utah by which he takes advantage of the benefit and
protection of its laws, and is further obliged reciprocally to
submit to its remedies.

In Hanks v. Administrator of Estate of

Jensen, 531 P.2d 363 (Utah 1974), while acknowledging that the
Utah Long-arm Statute is applied to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause, this Court clarified that:
It is nonetheless true that our courts cannot take
jurisdiction over a resident of another state simply
for the convenience or desire of the plaintiff. The
rationale of statutes and the decisional law in the
trend toward extending jurisdiction over foreign
residents is that there must be some intentional and
purposeful activity of the defendant in the forum
state by which he takes advantage of the benefits and
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protections of its laws, and is obliged reciprocally
to submit to its remedies. (Emphasis added.)
Hanks, 531 P.2d at 364.
In the instant action, there is no purposefully established
relationship between the respondents and this forum.

Since the

controversy cannot relate to activities in the forum state,
significant contacts of a "continuous and systematic nature"
must be asserted to support jurisdiction.

Helicopteros

Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);
Abbott G.M.

Diesel, Inc.

850 (Utah, 1978).

v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d

Respondents do not engage in any continuous

or systematic activity in Utah.

In fact, their contacts with

Utah, if any, are so sporadic and so minimal, that it is in no
way reasonable for them to anticipate being brought to court
here.
B.

(Record at 1444-46 and 1466-67.)
ASPRS And Dr. Goldwyn Could Not Reasonably Anticipate
Being Haled Into Court In Utah.

The United States Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he due
process clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not
being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he
has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties or relations.'"
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319.

See

also Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985).

The United States Supreme Court also stated that "the

foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . .
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is that the defendant's conduct in connection with the forum
state [is] such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there."

Worldwide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.

The only conceivable relationship between ASPRS and the
State of Utah arises from the fact that out of approximately
2,600 active members of the Society, 30 members reside in this
State (Record at 1445 and Schedler Affidavit at 1f 7.)

The

controversy in this case does not stem from any activities
relating to ASPRS membership.

The presence of in-state member-

ship in an out-of-state organization is not a sufficient basis
upon which to base an assertion of jurisdiction over the
organization.

Szabo v. Medical Information Bureau, 127 Cal.

App.3d 51, 179 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1981); Elizabeth Hospital, Inc.
v. Richardson, 167 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Ark. 1958), aff'd, 269
F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
Indeed, co hold otherwise would be tantamount to finding
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation merely because it has
shareholders who reside here.
such a holding.

Case authority clearly forbids

See, e.g., Oostdyk v. British Airtours, Ltd.,

424 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Dr. Goldwyn's only relationship and the State of Utah is an
attenuated monitoring function and limited correspondence with
Dr. Woolf arising out of either Anderson or her physician's
unilateral acts.

Exercise of Long-arm jurisdiction under these

circumstances cannot comport with due process.
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Such attenuated

contacts with Utah have been consistently held insufficient for
assertion of in personam jurisdiction.

See Union Ski Co. v.

Union Plastic's Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976); and Cate
Rental Co. v. Whalen & Co., 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976).
In summary, ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn have not purposefully
engaged in any activity or conduct in this State and do not
have sufficient contacts with the State of Utah to reasonably
anticipate being haled into a Utah court under the Utah
Long-arm Statute or applicable Utah law.
C.

Assertion Of Jurisdiction Over ASPRS And Dr. Goldwyn
Would Violate Social Policy.

There is an important public policy, favoring exchange and
development of new medical technology and treatment.

This

public policy encourages widespread dissemination of technology, programs and medications in order to improve the health
and welfare of our society.

Many of the programs and studies

that achieve these policy considerations are introduced into
all or many of the United States.

If those who participate on

a limited basis in the furtherance of such programs are
subjected to unlimited jurisdiction throughout the United
States, it is inevitable that there will be a chilling effect
on sharing medical advances.
To avoid this undesirable result and give full force to the
constitutional limitations on assertion of in personam jurisdiction, the lower court's determination that "[t]o assert in
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personam jurisdiction over [ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn] under the
circumstances of this case would constitute a violation of
constitutional due process" must be affirmed.

(Record at 1740.)

Respondents' liberty interests in not being subject to the
binding judgment of a forum with which they have established no
meaningful contacts, ties, or relations would be severely
violated in the instant case if a jurisdictional finding were
made.

It would also be unrealistic to suggest that respondents

should reasonably anticipate being haled into Utah's courts
when they have done nothing to avail themselves of the benefits
and protections of Utah and have not engaged in any significant
activity in Utah.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondents submit that
in personam jurisdiction in the State of Utah is lacking.
Accordingly, ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn respectfully requests this
Court to affirm the lower court's Order of Dismissal.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

SCMLRL120
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ADDENDUM "A"

ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
LARRY R. LAYCOCK (A4 868)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants,
Robert Goldwyn and American
Society of Plastic and
Reconstructive Surgeons
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CELIA ANDERSON,
-, • ^.^4r

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No.
BROADBENT & WOOLF, INC•, a
Utah corporation, ROBERT M. WOOLF,
individually, DOW CORNING
CORPORATION, ROBERT GOLDWYN,
an indivual, and THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC
AND RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGEONS,
Defendants.

C-83-7367

Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendants American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive
Surgeons ("ASPRS") and Dr. Robert M. Goldwynfs Motions to Quash
Service of Process and for Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint in
the above-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing before
the above-entitled court on September 25, 1987 in a special
setting at the hour of 9:00 a.m.; Elliott J. Williams and

A-l

Larry R. Laycock of Snow, Christensen & Martineau appeared
on behalf of defendants ASPRS and Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D.
and Dan Bertch appeared on behalf of plaintiff Celia Anderson,
and the court having heard oral argument, reviewed the pleadin
and memoranda filed herein, and being fully apprised in the
premises hereby finds:
1.

Defendant Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D., did not have

contacts with the State of Utah or plaintiff sufficient to
satisfy the minimum contacts requirement for assertion of
in personam jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah Long-Arm Statute
(Utah Code Ann.
2.

§ 78-27-24 (Supp. 1987)).

To assert in. personam jurisdiction over Dr. Goldwyn

under the circumstances of this case would constitute a
violation of constitutional due process.
3.

Dr. Goldwyn1s motion for dismissal and to quash

service of process should be granted on all of the grounds
listed in the memoranda submitted by Dr. Goldwyn.
4.

Defendant ASPRS did not have contacts with the

State of Utah or plaintiff sufficient to satisfy the minimum
contacts requirement for assertion of j_n personam jurisdiction
pursuant to the Utah Long-Arm Statute (Utah Code Ann, § 78-27(Supp. 1987)).
5.

To assert jln personam jurisdiction over ASPRS under

the circumstances of this case would constitute a violation
of constitutional due process.
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6.

ASPRS1 motion for dismissal and to quash service

of process should be granted on all of the grounds cited in
the memorada submitted by ASPRS.
7.

The court finds that there is no just reason for

delay and entry of judgment should be expressly directed
as provided in Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
NOW, THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE FOREGOING AND GOOD CAUSE
APPEARING THEREFOR, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Defendants ASPRS and Dr. Robert M. Goldwyn's motions

for dismissal and to quash service of process be and the same
are hereby granted and the plaintiff's claims against said
defendants are dismissed and service of process upon them is
quashed for the reason the courts of the State of Utah lack
personal jurisdiction over them.
2.

There is no just reason for delay and entry of

this Order as a final judgment is hereby expressly directed
pursuant to Rule 54(b),.Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

/ 7 day of October, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

vLe<pnard H. Russdl
S t r i c t Court Judge

ATTEST
H. DiXQWH'Ht" ".'
c : .-
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
•
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss •

SKAUNA JENSEN, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys
* „ Defendants ASPRS and Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D.
tor
she served the attached
Order of Dismissal

(Case No.)

C-83-7367

, _ _
^v_
herein, tna:
(unsigned)

^Qn

the

_r.

listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a:
envelope addressed to;
Dan Bertch, Esq.
Robert J. DeBry & Associates
4001 South 700 East, Suite 501
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
P. Keith Nelson, Esq.
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Ray R. Christensen, Esq.
Christensen, Jensen & Powell
510 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the 7th
day of October
, 1987.

of

SHAUNA JENSEN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7th £ a y
October
, 1937.

My Commission Expires

ADDENDUM "B"

ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
LARRY R. LAYCOCK (A4 868)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants,
Robert Goldwyn and American
Society of Plastic and
Reconstructive Surgeons
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CELIA ANDERSON,
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M.
GOLDWYN, M.D.

Plaintiff,
vs.
BROADBENT & WOOLF, INC., a
Utah corporation, ROBERT M.
WOOLF, individually, DOW
CORNING CORPORATION, ROBERT
GOLDWYN, an individual, and
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTIVE
SURGEONS,

Case No. C 8 3 - 7 3 6 7
J u d g e L e o n a r d H.

Russon

Defendants.

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTY OF

)
:ss.
)

DR. ROBERT M. GOLDWYN, being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and states the following upon his own personal
knowledge and information:
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I am a resident of Brookline, Massachusetts, and am over 21
years of age.
2.

I am a medical doctor specializing in plastic and

reconstructive surgery and am licensed to practice medicine in
the State of Massachusetts.

I am in private medical practice

in Brookline, Massachusetts.
3.

Although I am a member of the American Society of

Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc. ("Society"), I am not
employed as a medical doctor for the Society.

I have never

performed any medical service or treatment whatsoever on behalf
of the Society in Utah or anywhere else.
4.

I am not an agent, employee or representative of Dow

Corning Corporation.

I have never performed any medical

treatment or service for Dow Corning Corporation in Utah or
anywhere else.
5.

I am not presently and never have been licensed to

practice medicine in Utah.

I have never advertised, maintained

an office or otherwise transacted any business in the State of
Utah.

Further, I do not own, use or possess any real property

situated in Utah.
6.

I was appointed medical monitor for the MDX4-4011

Silicone Injection Study by agreement with the Federal Drug
Administration and the Society for the purpose of screening
potential patients for the said Silicone Injection Study.
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Medical information for Celia Anderson was forwarded to
Massachusetts from her physician for the purpose of obtaining
my approval for Celia Anderson's voluntary entry into the
Silicone Injection Study.

Based on the information I received

from Celia Anderson's physician, I approved her entry into the
Silicone Injection Study.
7.

My role in Celia Anderson's entry in the Silicone

Injection Study was limited to review of medical information
provided by her physician.
Massachusetts.

That review was conducted in

I have never seen or communicated with Celia

Anderson.
DATED this

day of July, 1987.

Dr. Robert Goldwyn
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
1987.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:__
My Commission Expires:

SCMLRL54
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day of July,

ADDENDUM "C"

STATE OF ILLINOIS

)
)
)

COUNTY OF COOK

SS. :

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS R. SCHEDLER
Thomas R. Schedler, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and states:
1.

I am the Executive Director of the American Society of

Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc. ("ASPRS").
2.

ASPRS was founded in 1931, and is incorporated under

the not-for-profit corporation laws of the State of Illinois.
ASPRS has its headquarters and principal place of business in
Chicago, Illinois.

ASPRS is exempt from federal income taxation

under Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.
3.

ASPRS has no office or employee in the State of Utah.

ASPRS is not qualified to do business in the State of Utah, has
not designated an agent for acceptance of service of process in
Utah, has not contracted to supply services or goods in Utah, and
has no telephone listing or bank account in Utah. ASPRS does not
own, use or possess any real estate in Utah.
4.

ASPRS does not practice medicine or manufacture, sell

or distribute MDX 4-4011 or any drug or device in Utah or any
state, and did not draft, prepare or distribute the consent form
in issue.
5.

ASPRS

is

a

voluntary

association

comprising

approximately 2,600 active members, who are practicing plastic
surgeons in the United States and Canada.

C-l
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6.
annual

The ASPRS membership
meeting

is held

meets once a year.

in various cities.

The ASPRS

The ASPRS

annual

meeting has never been held in the State of Utah.
7.

Approximately

30 active ASPRS members

reside

in the

State of Utah.
8.
attend

As part of my duties as ASPRS Executive Director, I
meetings

of various medical

societies, public

interest

groups or government agencies throughout the United States.

I

have never represented ASPRS at a function in the State of Utah.
For at least the past ten years, ASPRS has never been represented
at a function in the State of Utah.
9.

For at least the past ten years, ASPRS has conducted no

educational symposia or seminars in the State of Utah.
10.

ASPRS does not license, certify or accredit physicians

or hospitals.

Membership in ASPRS is not a prerequisite to the

practice of medicine or surgery in any state.
11.

ASPRS does not solicit applications for membership, but

accepts applications from qualified physicians who are sponsored
for membership by two ASPRS active members.
12.

Applications for membership in ASPRS are submitted to

the ASPRS office in Chicago, Illinois.

When the membership file

in Chicago is complete, including letters of reference and other
supporting information, the application is reviewed in Chicago by
the ASPRS Membership Committee.
Membership
Directors.

Committee

are

Favorable recommendations by the

presented

If an application

to

the

is approved

by

ASPRS

Board

the Board,

of
the
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applicant's name is submitted to the assembled membership at the
ASPRS

annual meeting, and a favorable vote of

present

and

voting

is

required

to admit

an

80% of

those

applicant

to

membership in ASPRS.
13.

All membership dues are billed from and paid to the

ASPRS office in Chicago, Illinois.

In 1986, estimated total dues

collected from all ASPRS members was $lf300,000.

Estimated dues

collected during 1986 from active members residing in Utah were
$14,500.
14.

ASPRS is governed by a 21-member Board of Directors.

No directors reside in Utah.
15.

My personal domicile and residence are in the State of

Illinois.
Further Affiant saith not.

Thomas R< Schedler
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
before me this V% day
of v]j«^y
1987

Notary Public

My Commission e x p i r e s frAv<6i# \1k Hffl
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on the 14th day of April,
1988, I cause four (4) true and correct copies of the
Brief of Respondents ASPRS and Dr. Robert Goldwyn to be
served upon the following:

Daniel F. Bertch
Robert J. DeBry
Robert J. DeBry & Associates
Attorneys for Appellant
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
P. Keith Nelson
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Attorneys for Broadbent & Woolf
and Dr. Woolf
50 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Ray R. Christensen
Christensen, Jensen & Powell
Attorneys for Dow Corning Corporation
510 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

